1. Suppose
scientists were to discover a “partiality gene” that all humans possess. According to the scientists, human beings randomly
developed a gene that drives human agents to impart greater value and
importance on persons and projects that are closer in proximity (intimacy) to
the individual in question. What
difference, if any, should such a finding make to how we should think about
questions of communal / societal / global moral responsibilities and the
demands of justice?
2. Suppose you are a married man. You are in a marriage going on 10 years and a
father of three. You and your wife split
the responsibilities equally, and by any plausible account of the moral
requirements parents owe their children, you and your wife are living up to
them. While being a good parent, you
also have the opportunity to do many things you enjoy and pursue long-term
projects that fit best into your life plan.
You and your wife both work less than 50 hours a week at jobs you both
enjoy. In fact, a few years back you
were able to leave a high-paying job at a fancy law firm that made you
miserable in order to pursue a less-lucrative but much more fulfilling career
as a college professor. You are much
happier with this lifestyle, and you frequently tell others that “income” is
not measured entirely by monetary compensation, but importantly includes
quality-of-life opportunities, and such income cannot be measured easily in
dollars and cents. Now suppose that one day out of the blue your wife decides
to bolt, leaving you to raise your three children alone. Are you now subject to
greater moral responsibilities in the sense that you are now morally required
to do more things and sacrifice more of your projects and pursuits for the sake
of your children? Or does morality permit you to continue with the path you are
on, that is, you are able to discharge all of your parental obligations without
making a change at all (any additional sacrifices being supererogatory)? More
generally, are your moral responsibilities affected at all by the parental
failings of your former wife?
3. Suppose a certain
moral-political ideal requires certain outputs that can only be brought about
by institutional schemes designed to produce such outputs. Suppose that, upon further theorizing about
institutional design, it becomes clear that the ideal can only be realized at
the cost of other cherished values, a consequence not taken into account in the
original conceptualization and explication of the fundamental ideals. This is because at the ideal stage, the
theorists made certain idealizing assumptions regarding the epistemic
capacities of individuals and ideal institutional schemes. What difference, if any, should such a
finding make on how we should think about the structure and content of our
fundamental values, moral responsibilities, and the demands of justice? Should we revisit our reasoning that led to
this particular formulation of the ideal?
4. Suppose that
in an ideal society, everyone has as much liberty, educational opportunity,
self-respect, income, and wealth as can be reasonably hoped for consistent with
the principles of ideal justice. Suppose
that in our nonideal world we face a decision among two feasible policies
options: (1) we can pursue a policy that will slightly increase equality in
educational opportunity, but significantly decrease the income of the
worst-off, or (2) we can pursue another policy which will maintain the (slight)
inequalities in educational opportunity, diminish the social bases of
self-respect, but increase, over time, the income of the worst-off. Which
course of action should we pursue? What difference, if any, does it make to know
that in an ideal society, we would have much more income, educational
opportunity, and self-respect than we do now or can expect to have given our
current feasible options?
5. Suppose that
you are a partner at a fancy corporate law firm in New York city, with many
lower-level associates and employees at your beck-and-call. Suppose that you were able to achieve such a
position partly because of the superior quality of your educational background
(private schooling as a child and teenager, Ivy League undergraduate and law
school credentials) in comparison to those who work for you. Suppose further that you value greatly your
own freedom and the flexibility your senior position permits you: you love
being your own boss, getting around to things when you feel like it, not when
some crotchety old man tells you to. Now
suppose that you come to learn that this flexibility you value so greatly—a
flexibility made possible partly by differences in educational history—has
serious negative health effects on those who work for you (the stress arising
from unpredictability, etc.). Does the
fact that your position was made possible by differences in educational
opportunities make any difference to how you ought to behave within the context
of the employer-employee relationship?
Do such facts make any difference from the point of view of justice?
6. Suppose
scientists were to discover certain biological and cognitive features possessed
by the vast majority of people that results in irresponsible, irrational, and
closed-minded behavior. How, if at all,
should such a scientific discovery affect how we think about fundamental moral-political
values, such as autonomy, political equality, and democratic self-governance?
These questions,
along with many others like them, fall within the broad scope of a more general
philosophical terrain, covering such issues as the role, purpose, and value of ideal
and nonideal theorizing, and how they relate to and influence each other. These questions are extremely complex and of first
importance. The “problem of utopianism,” the problem of
“complacent realism,” and the issues surrounding the ideal-nonideal debate are
of central concern for moral and political philosophy.
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